Day 1631

Russia fires, Ukraine counts (and vice versa)

At 05:53 this morning, Telegram lit up: “Two Zircons in the direction of Kyiv.” Two more Russian missiles headed our way before most of us had found our glasses.

Night became morning the way it has for months now — the internet thick with messages insisting that incoming projectiles had disappeared over Chernihiv region.

Maybe.

After four and a half years of full-blown war, the arithmetic is getting hard to ignore.

Russia is leaning harder on ballistic missiles. In July, according to Ukrainian Air Force data cited by the ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data), Russia fired 198 of them at Ukrainian targets — a record monthly barrage. Ukrainian officials and Western analysts put Moscow’s production capacity at roughly 70 ballistic missiles a month.

Ukraine’s problem was never knowing what’s coming. It’s having something that can stop it.

Patriot remains Ukraine’s only reliably effective defence against ballistic missiles, and its stock of PAC-3 interceptors is dangerously low. The July 6 attack made the problem brutal and literal: Ukraine’s air defences intercepted none of the 23 ballistic missiles launched that night¹.

Russia isn’t being subtle about targets — kindergartens, hospitals, transport hubs, energy and water infrastructure. It wants to make the country unlivable. Kyiv is the test case.

The West has known this for a while. The Financial Times is now arguing that Europe needs to hand over more Patriot interceptors, speed up SAMP/T NG deliveries, and expand production — and that longer term, Ukraine and its allies should bring defence start-ups into the business of building cheaper interceptors.

All sensible. There’s a catch.

Ukraine has learned to build a remarkable amount without the state — drones, boats, software, electronic warfare, ground robots. The genius of that system is its fragmentation: thousands of small actors experimenting, failing, adapting, trying again.

Antiballistic missiles defense doesn’t work that way.

You can crowdsource the missile. You cannot crowdsource the Ka-band radar seeker. A ballistic shield needs radar, tracking, command architecture, communications, guidance, seekers, launchers, software — and enough interceptors to make the arithmetic hold.

Ukraine is building its own answer in Freyja. Good luck.

Until then, the arithmetic stays what it is. Russia fires. Ukraine counts. And Kyiv waits to see which number runs out first — the missiles in Russia’s magazine, or the interceptors in ours.

You can route around a broken state. You cannot route around a ballistic missile.

1. Day 1594. Durable until Tuesday (July 7, 2026)