Day 851
More attacks, casualties, etc
As of this writing on Monday morning, Russia bombed Odesa again. Not exactly civilian infrastructure. Casualties reported.
The attack comes a day after missiles, equipped with cluster warheads, were shot down by Russian air defence systems in Crimea. Russia’s Defense Ministry said missile debris killed four people, including two children, and injured 151 more.
There were three dead and scores wounded in guided aerial bomb attacks on Kharkiv on Saturday, when one of the four bombs creamed a residential building near the city’s bus terminal. On Sunday, more of the same.
The moment of one impact.
Z posted his daily pep talk from Kharkiv over the weekend, as well as the start of a meeting of with the country’s top generals and managers.
The president was flanked by the parliament speaker, prime minister and defense minister, on the right, the head of the President’s Office and secretary of National Defense and Security Council, on the left.
The men at the head of the table have almost zero (nil, 0) military experience, with the possible exception of the NSDC secretary, Oleksandr Litvinenko, who in 1994 attended Russia’s Institute of Cryptography, Communications and Informatics of the Academy of the Federal Security Service. He is the only one dressed in civilian clothes. I don’t see any women.
I read “PARALLEL CHEREMUSHKIN: THE ABSENCE AND PRESENCE OF ‘WAR’ IN A PROVINCIAL RUSSIAN CITY” by Ilya Roshal.
At the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war, sociologists, experts, and the general public were concerned with the question of how much Russians support the war unleashed by Putin - is it his war or the war of the Russian population? Today it is more or less clear that quantitative distributions give us only a very limited answer to this question: there is a group of staunch supporters of the war that sincerely resonates with official narratives, and there is a group of staunch opponents - and a large "gray zone" in between.
Over the course of 2022, researchers at the Public Sociology Lab (PS Lab) collected a large array of in-depth interviews in which they attempted to find out how and why Russian citizens support/do not support or oppose the war. This work has provided a deeper understanding of how people resolve value and cognitive conflicts in their search for ways to adapt to a repressive-militaristic reality. However, it also emerged that the interview situation itself creates a context of publicness in which informants turn willy-nilly to the arguments and narratives of public polemics.
To obtain additional and less mediated data on Russians' attitudes toward war and military everyday life in present-day Russia, the researchers undertook another incredible immersion experiment. PS Lab team members traveled to three Russian regions where they spent a month in an inclusive observation mode, without, of course, disclosing the subject of their study.
Very dark.
As it follows from the observations of our researcher, information about the great loss of life during the war is not a secret for the townspeople, and the funerals of local mobilized and volunteer soldiers allow them to see it for themselves. At the same time, with a wide range of emotions about the war, only convinced opponents of the "special operation" speak about the damage and suffering it brings to Ukraine and its inhabitants. For the majority of Russians, who justify the war and are simultaneously dissatisfied with various aspects of it, criticism of the war as a crime against Ukrainians is irrelevant. Moreover, such criticism leads them to justify Russia's actions in an effort to avoid the dilemma of complicity.
For drone warfare enthusiasts, c/o Madyar:
Defensive lines in eastern Ukraine are holding, kind of, in some places, maybe, depending. The entire country has been put on an electricity consumption diet.