Rudolf Carnap appeals to the Principle of Sufficient Reason as a proper principle in the development of the theory of extension, which is a proper subject within scientific philosophy. In Carnap we can find a kind of reciprocal relation between science, where ultimately the principle of indifference rules, and scientific philosophy, where …
…”it is also generally agreed that this determination of extension involves uncertainty and possible error. But since this holds for all concepts of empirical science, nobody regards this fact as a sufficient reason for rejecting the concepts of the theory of extension. The sources of uncertainty are chiefly the following: first, the linguist's acceptance of the result that a given thing is denoted by 'Hund' for Karl may be erroneous, e.g., due to a misunderstanding or a factual erroro of Karl's and, second, the generalization of things which he has not tested suffers, of course, from the uncertainty of all inductive infererence. Carnap, ”Meaning and Synonymy in Natural Languages" (source)
Which brings us to Mississippi or maybe Tennessee…