Ukraine has no Uniform Code of Military Justice. There are no Article 15s. That may explain, in part, why commanders of the 80th Halytska Separate Airborne Assault Brigade complained publicly about plans to replace their commander Colonel Emil Ishkulov. Maybe Shawn Ryan will do a podcast about the soap opera. Until then, we are forced to rely on sweaty Mariana Bezuhla, a member of parliament and a lightning rod for war-related confusion, for details.
The red blob east of Pokrovsk continues to grow and the invaders have crossed the canal outside of Chasiv Yar. Donald at Sarcastosaurus has posted a four-part post about the mess with maps and arrows.
The New York Times writes about the withdrawal from Urozhaine1. Photojournalist & Nat Geo Explorer David helped document the mess.
Practicing philosopher Volodymyr Pastukhov wrote a wordy post about what he calls the “Ukrainian National Project.”
For the Ukrainian intelligentsia, the war became a pretext for an accelerated solution to the historical task of "cultural decolonization," which had not been solved for almost two centuries and the solution of which in a "soft form" would have required at least several more decades. But for Z's team, the emphasis on radical Ukrainization was a move towards least resistance in solving the really urgent task of political mobilization of society in the face of aggression. Other technologies were more complex and required greater transparency and efficiency from the authorities themselves.
Really?
Around the end of 2022, a new national idea was formed in Ukraine in its final form with the active participation of the authorities. It united the people and the authorities not in words but in deeds: the idea of hatred of Russians and everything Russian. Putting aside inappropriate moralizing, it should be recognized that mobilization on hatred is the most natural, logical and simple way out of any difficult situation in a war, and it would be strange hypocrisy to make some inflated demands on Ukrainians in this matter - like, the Germans and Russians can, but you, excuse me, can't. But, unfortunately, everything has its price.
No. I don’t remember it this way. Otherwise, I would have written about it.
In late 2022, trust in political authorities (read President’s Office) began to dissipate due to ineptitude, malfeasance, political interference in military affairs, failure to build fortifications, failure to organise the production and provision of military hardware, especially UAVs and, most recently, failure to attract and train (enough) new recruits.
By late 2003, the slow-motion soap opera dismissal of Commander-in-Chief Valery Zaluzhny — the most popular and trusted official in Ukraine — began to pick up speed. Z finally appointed a new Commander-in-Chief, Oleksandr Syrsky, on February 8, 2024.
As we noted yesterday, there is no polemic between Z and his top managers and ordinary citizens about plans to address gigantic, life-threatening problems. This has to change2.
After Furious Battles, Ukraine Loses a Pair of Hard-Won Villages. “It was like a fight between two packs of dogs,” said an officer, describing the struggle for one of the areas, Urozhaine. But “there came a moment when it made no sense to keep people there.” (The New York Times, July 30, 2024)