The Economist says Uncle Joe should allow Ukraine to use its weapons to strike targets deeper in Russia1.
Actually, no. Team USA simply does not trust Ukraine’s self-aggrandizing duopolistic chain of command headed by an emotionally challenged supreme commander-in-chief who is seldom consistent and easily carried away.
Which brings me to the reported dismissal yesterday of the head of Ukraine's state grid operator Ukrenergo, Volodymyr Kudrytskyi, for allegedly failing to safeguard energy facilities from Russian attacks. Ukraine top energy officials are widely regarded as either inept or incourigibly corrupt. Kukrytskyi had been one of the few exceptions.
On the war jacket, Michael Kofman and Rob Lee wrote a long and windy essay about the decision to invade Russia2.
I’m not inclined take this analysis seriously because of the gambling, bargaining chips metaphors. Also the word hope appears twice.
Ukraine’s romantic militarists have failed to unify the country around a coherent military strategy to counter Russian aggression, devise and implement forced conscription and provide soldiers with adequate resources and fall-back lines of defense. Their excessive interest in what strikes them as proper manuever has been unhelpful. Perhaps most resented is the certainty of their infallibility.
Finally got around to watching Victoria’s swan song.
I do not accept the narrative that the main mistake of Obama and all subsequent American leaders was not interfering enough in Russian and Ukrainian affairs. I think the intervention was excessive and very often inadequate. At times, it was simply wrong. Future generations will have a lot of work ahead of them sorting out mistakes. This, of course, does not absolve Russia or Putin personally of responsibility for the bloody mess we have been in since 2014.
And, finally, this hagiography, "The Iron General: Lessons of Humanity"
American restrictions on hitting Russia are hurting Ukraine. The Biden administration’s justifications keep changing (The Economist, September 2, 2024)
Ukraine’s Gamble. The Risks and Rewards of the Offensive Into Russia’s Kursk Region (Foreign Affairs, September 2, 2024)